Here’s a look at the residential construction industry. Except for the first mention of Current $, All $ in this analysis are inflation adjusted Constant 2019$, so all years can be compared on equal terms. All numbers are rounded slightly.

Currently in 2024 $, residential construction spending is $940 billion/year, 43% of all construction. Only 60% of that ($560 billion) is spending on new housing units. The other 40% is Reno.

Currently for 2024, residential construction supports 3,350,000 jobs. Only 60% of the jobs (2,000,000) are for new units.

30 years ago residential construction spending was $550 billion/year and there were 2,200,000 jobs. On average over 30 years (including all up or down years) we’ve added $14 billion/year in spending and 38,000 jobs per year.

The 30 year (1995-2024) average growth in residential spending, counting only 21 up years, (eliminating all 9 down years) is +$36 billion/year. There were 2 years that we added +$70 billion/year in spending (one of those in 2021) and including those, there were only 7 years over +$50 billion/year.

The 30 year (1995-2024) average growth in residential jobs, counting only 21 up years, (eliminating down years) is +125,000 jobs/year. In 1999, we added 270,000 residential jobs. Since 2011, the most we’ve added in a year is 170,000 jobs in 2021. That’s for ALL residential construction.

In 30 years, we’ve never added more than $70 billion/year in residential construction spending nor more than 270,000 residential jobs in a year. Since 2011, the most residential spending increased was $70 billion in a year and the most residential jobs increased was 170,000 jobs in a year, both in 2021.

Only 60% of all residential spending and jobs is associated with building new housing units. The other 40% is renovations, not associated with new construction. That must be considered when reviewing all the historical data noted above. So the following is just to look at the data without renovation.

Reduce the data by 40% to eliminate spending and jobs associated with renovation and look at just the data associated with building new housing units: In 30 years, we’ve never added more than $40 billion/year (2004,2021) in residential construction spending on new units nor more than 160,000 residential jobs in a year (1999,2005). This is for New Units construction only.

Since 2011, the most spending increased for new units was $40 billion in a year (in Constant 2019$) and the most jobs increased was 100,000 residential jobs, both in 2021.

The last time residential jobs for new units increased by 100,000 or more in a year was 2005. Best growth ever was 2004-2005-2006, when we averaged +120,000 jobs/yr for 3 years, just for new units. In fact, the only times residential jobs for new units increased by more than 100,000 were 1999, 2004, 2005 and then finally again in 2021. But 2004-2006 was a time when the construction unemployment rate averaged 7.5%-8.5%. In 2021, construction unemployment averaged 6%. Now the unemployment rate is averaging 4.5%.

(It would be wise to use post-2011 data for the jobs analysis. The construction industry, especially residential and nonres bldgs, experienced a labor base reset in the period 2006-2010, a period from which we have never fully recovered. Notice in this plot that residential was nearly level at 4000 for 10 years, then from 2005-2009, it shot up to over 5000. It’s remained near 5000 since 2010.).

If we were to match the maximum growth rates since 2011 (and in the case of spending, since 1994) we would increase new residential units construction spending by $40bil/$390bil = 10% and we would increase new residential jobs by 100,000/2,000,000 = 5%. Spending maxed at 10%, but jobs max growth at 5%.

The number of new housing units built in a year varies, but for this post I’ll use 1,500,000. Currently it’s a bit less than that. Increasing new units by 5% to 10% per year on a base of 1.5 million units/year would net a growth between 75,000 to 150,000 added units per year. Let’s use 100,000 new units in the first year. That would be 6.7% growth, already more than the 5% jobs. We would continue the growth, so we increase that by another 100,000 in the 2nd year, and again in the 3rd and 4th years. Leave no doubt, growth of 100,000 units/yr would mean adding jobs to match or exceed the best single-year growth rate in the residential new units construction industry since 2005, and keep matching that growth rate for four consecutive years.

CORRECTION: 8-21-24 The Corrections (now fixed) above raise the upper limit of potential growth based on spending from 7% to 10%, or 150,000 units/yr, but only if we take the result to be dependant on the upper limit % spending growth. I had divided by current $ when I should divide by constant $. Spending can vary a lot more than jobs. While some years of jobs growth reach 6%-7%, average residential jobs growth is just over 4%. Jobs never grow at 10%/year.

This plot shows the steady growth in residential jobs, 75% over 15 years. Compounded that’s about 4%/yr. So, it seems much more likely the limiting factor here is jobs, not spending.

In this analysis, the number of units was chosen at 100,000/yr., an increase of 6.7%/yr., well below potential spending growth but already more than jobs growth. The jobs increase in 2021 was 5%/yr. In 2004-2005, jobs growth was 8%/yr. So, this 6.7% is near the high end of potential jobs growth. This implies an add of 130,000 jobs.

So we would increase new units by 100,000 + 200,000 + 300,000 + 400,000 or 1,000,000 total new affordable residential units over the next 4 years.

By this rough analysis, to increase new residential units by 3 million over current production over the next 4 years would require that we increase residential construction and jobs by 3x greater than the best performance achieved in the construction industry in the last 30 years, and keep it up for the next 4 consecutive years. That’s more jobs than the entire construction industry gains in one year and the new units subset of construction is only 25% of all construction.

Although there has been times past when jobs increased by 120,000/year, that was a time when unemployment was much higher and there were more workers available to readily go back into the workforce. It’s not impossible that jobs can grow faster, and therefore also the number of new units, but it is unlikely.

If a substantial portion of the current 1,500,000 unit production (500,000 units a year for the next 4 years) were shifted over to affordable units, the picture changes considerably. But I wouldn’t expect that current demand to just go away and shift to lower cost units. So, this leaves current demand as is and adds jobs.

A Proposal: If some amount of the funds to be invested in this program is directed towards trades training programs, within two years, and every year after, we could potentially be turning out some of the extra 260,000 additional workers we would need every year to achieve 3 million new housing units. This approach would create both good jobs and new affordable homes. Incentivize the training program somehow. Paid internship. Perhaps with a guarantee in return to work for 2-3yrs. If we don’t invest in training workers for this effort, we cannot build more than the labor we have. Here’s a thread on my training proposal. https://x.com/EdZarenski/status/1828778915055468816